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ABSTRACT 
We present the results of the first annual Human-Agent League 
of ANAC. By introducing a new human-agent negotiating plat-
form to the research community at large, we facilitated new ad-
vancements in human-aware agents. This has succeeded in push-
ing the envelope in agent design, and creating a corpus of useful 
human-agent interaction data. Our results indicate a variety of 
agents were submitted, and that their varying strategies had dis-
tinct outcomes on many measures of the negotiation. These 
agents approach the problems endemic to human negotiation, 
including user modeling, bidding strategy, rapport techniques, 
and strategic bargaining. Some agents employed advanced tac-
tics in information gathering or emotional displays and gained 
more points than their opponents, while others were considered 
more “likeable” by their partners. 
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1 INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND 
Automated negotiation has been presented in previous works as 
a key challenge problem for the advancement of virtual hu-
mans—agents that possess human-like characteristics. Negotia-
tion has been described as an “indispensable skill for any social 
creature”, and the fruits of research into automated negotiating 
agents have myriad benefits [5]. Specifically, automated negoti-
ating agents are capable of training humans to be better negotia-
tors, and insights gleaned from the design of such agents can 
lead to the development of more general teaching agents [3,8]. 
Additionally, automated agents provide benefits to empirical 
studies, as they can provide a consistent confederate, unchang-
ing and tireless over the course of a human-subjects study [5].  
Beyond training humans to be better negotiators, negotiating 
agents can also serve as virtual assistants for a variety of applica-
tions. Google’s recent Duplex demo demonstrates this astutely, 
as an agent acts on behalf of a human to create an appointment, 
negotiating with a human partner to decide on an agreeable time 
[7]. Legal scholarship has long examined the ethics of acting on 
behalf of others [12,15], and psychology and computer science 
have both explored the mechanisms by which humans instruct 
their representatives, be they human or virtual [4,11].  
Of course, such negotiating agents require many components 
to render them fully capable of acting as negotiating partners. 
The design of negotiating agents presents problems in strategy, 
opponent modelling, preference elicitation, rapport-building, 
natural language generation/understanding, non-verbal behavior 
generation, use of emotional affect, to name just a few. When 
creating agents, designers must address, at the bare minimum, 
how an agent will model its opponent (through their utterances 
and/or offer patterns), how the agent will make offers, and how 
it will respond to offers. 
Designing automated negotiating agents has been an ongoing 
area of research. One such way in which this research has been 
driven is by researcher collaboration during the Automated Ne-
gotiating Agents Competition (ANAC) [6]. While ANAC has 
been a recurrent, successful competition for 8 years (2018 has 
marked the 9th annual ANAC), it has been focused primarily on 
agent-agent negotiation. Human-agent negotiation is fundamen-
tally different than agent-agent negotiation, and the Human-
Agent Track of ANAC was added to promote research into this 
promising area.  
Agents that are developed with humans in mind need not 
emulate their behaviors (although that may be a goal in certain 
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2 
circumstances), but do need to be able to respond human behav-
iors intelligently. First and foremost, this presents a problem for 
agents to accurately model their opponents. Since negotiation is 
not a fully-visible scenario, agents must make educated decisions 
about user preferences, user alternatives to agreement (referred 
to as “Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement, or “BATNA”), 
and individual user personality types/strategies. Agents may use 
a variety of information sources to come to their conclusions, 
including the user history of offers, the natural language utter-
ances they send, and even the emotions they express. 
Beyond opponent modeling, agents must decide their own 
behaviors in a negotiation. Although starting with a tough offer 
and conceding slowly is a known negotiating tactic in both hu-
man and agent-agent negotiations, it does have its risks. Certain 
negotiating partners are more disagreeable than others, and may 
fight back, lowering the joint value possible if an agent is too 
aggressive early on. Agents may also decide how optimistic or 
pessimistic to be in the face of uncertainty. And they must de-
cide how to utilize their BATNA strategically, and if they want 
to follow certain strategies that may be considered unethical 
(such as lying). 
Finally, agents must also be able to adapt to individual differ-
ences in negotiation. While a single strategy may be helpful in 
many cases, the best agents (and negotiators of any provenance) 
must be able to read the situation and adjust accordingly. These 
problems may be addressed with a variety of solutions, many of 
which are on display here, in the results from ANAC 2017. 
2 COMPETITION DESIGN 
2.1 IAGO Negotiation Platform 
The IAGO Negotiation platform was proposed and designed by 
Mell et al. and was selected to be used for the Human-Agent 
League of ANAC [10]. IAGO provides a front-facing GUI for the 
human-participants (see Figure 1). This GUI is web-based, and 
does not require plugins beyond JavaScript support. As such, it is 
supported on multiple browsers and systems, and can be utilized 
over the web without lengthy installation or training. In particu-
lar, this feature allows subjects to be recruited using online plat-
forms, such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). 
Additionally, IAGO provides the features necessary for simu-
lating the characteristics of human negotiation. These include an 
expanded set of channels for communication between both sides 
of negotiation, such as by sending text, expressing preferences, 
and transmitting emotions. This is in addition to the traditional 
methods supported by agent-agent negotiation platforms, such 
as exchanging offers. IAGO also allows offers to be sent that do 
not involve all the items in the negotiation (“partial offers”). 
These features of IAGO mean that it provides a platform to 
address the basic features that intelligent negotiating agents re-
quire. It provides information that allows for robust user model-
ing, and allows multiple channels for communicating in different 
ways. IAGO provides information that agents require to reason 
about their own preferences, and allows them to pursue a num-
ber of more complex strategies that require specific features 
(such as partial offers). 
 
Figure 1: IAGO Research Platform (Client View) 
2.2 Human-Agent Competition Design 
2.2.1  General Information 
The competition featured an array of participant-submitted 
agents competing against humans in a single, 10-minute, multi-
issue negotiation. Participants were also asked a series of ques-
tions, ranging from demographic information to reviews of the 
agent behavior. The submitted agents were judged along two 
categories, and prizes were awarded to the best two agents in 
each category. The first category, agent points, was purely per-
formance-based—agents that received more points in the negoti-
ation were scored higher. The second category, agent likeability, 
was determined by user-submitted responses to Likert-scale 
questions after the end of the negotiation. See Section 4.1 for 
more details on this measure. 
Agent designers were provided with a set of guidelines that 
restricted the domain of the negotiation within moderate 
bounds, but they were not given the details of the task itself, 
which was determined secretly prior to agent submission.  The 
guideless were summarized per the following equation: 
  
where k is the total number of issues. Succinctly, this means that 
the total for each side would be the same if that side got every 
item. In this way, the agent designers were given some idea of 
the scope of the negotiation.  
Designers were also provided with a limited set of natural 
language utterances that the humans could use in the negotia-
tion. Human players could also send messages that contained 
information about their preferences, in additional to using the 
emotional and offer channels. Agents were unrestricted in the 
types of messages they could send back to players. Finally, agent 
developers were provided with the source code for a baseline 
agent (“Pinocchio”) which was provided with the IAGO platform.  
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The competition’s negotiation had 4 issues, with a varying 
amount of levels to each. Respectively, each issue had 3, 2, 6, and 
3 items. The task was partially integrative, with both sides gain-
ing the most points by receiving the 6-item issue, but differing 
on their preferences for the two 3-item issues. Both sides also 
included a BATNA, which gave both players a minimum number 
of points should they fail to reach agreement. 
2.2.2  Participant Information 
Competition subject participants were selected from the MTurk 
subject pool. Subjects were adults, and asserted that they were 
permanent residents of the US (verified with IP address). Re-
striction to the US was chosen in order to reduce cross-cultural 
variance. Each submitted competition agent was tested against 
25 participants. Participants were not re-used or matched against 
more than one agent. Subjects were asked a set of verification 
questions/attention checks to ensure they comprehended and 
were engaged in the negotiation. 
All participants were presented with a tutorial of the system 
before use. Participants were paid regardless of their success in 
the negotiation. However, they were also awarded “lottery tick-
ets” based on their performance. These lottery tickets then en-
tered them into a prize drawing for one of several $10 MTurk 
credits, incentivizing good performance during the negotiation. 
Subjects were removed from the pool if the agent against which 
they were matched encountered an unrecoverable crash. In this 
case, the subjects were not rerun. 10 total subjects were removed 
in this fashion. This design allowed the competition to follow 
best practices for subject recruitment and handling, in line with 
other research [1]. 
3 AGENT DESIGN 
Table 1: Agent Provenance 
Agent 
Name 
Institution Primary Author 
Pinocchio University of Southern California, USA Johnathan Mell 
Elphaba College of Mgmt Academic Studies, Israel Dor Nisim 
Cena Southwest University, China Siqi Chen 
Wotan Southwest University, China Lichun Yuan 
Murphy Özyeğin University, Turkey Celal O.B. Yavuz 
LyingAgent University of Southern California, USA Zahra Nazari 
3.1.1  Pinocchio (Baseline) 
The baseline agent was provided as source code to all partici-
pants of the competition. Pinocchio followed a straightforward 
strategy—it attempted to gain information about the human’s 
preferences, then made fair partial offers, giving away one item 
at a time until all items were assigned. These offers were made 
in response to user offers, and Pinocchio did not generate offers 
on its own outside of these counter-offers. It also used only posi-
tive emotions. Pinocchio has been discussed in detail in previous 
work, as a part of the IAGO toolkit [9]. 
3.1.2  Elphaba 
Elphaba used a mixture of positive and negative emotions (an-
ger, happiness, and sadness), depending on a user “reliability” 
score. Reliability increased when user preferences were detected, 
and decreased when contradictions in user statements were ex-
posed. From this, Elphaba grew value for both human and agent. 
3.1.3  Agent Cena 
Agent Cena was an aggressive agent, utilizing tough statements 
and negative emotions to attempt to browbeat opponents into 
giving up value. Cena started with unreasonably high offers (90% 
of the total value), and slowly conceded, accelerating in the last 3 
minutes of the negotiation. Cena did attempt to give the human 
player their most valuable item first. 
3.1.4  Agent Wotan 
Wotan was similar to Cena in that it started with a high offer 
and conceded, although it would concede further and faster than 
Cena. Furthermore, Wotan only made full offers, in an attempt 
to save time. Wotan also conceded more if it thought the total 
value would increase. Wotan used neutral text and emotions. 
3.1.5  Agent Murphy 
Agent Murphy utilized several innovations, including a prefer-
ence graph which was updated after user statements. It also took 
a pessimistic view of the human’s preferences, tending to assume 
the worst possible outcome. Murphy also attempted to lighten 
the mood with occasional jokes. 
3.1.6  LyingAgent 
LyingAgent focused on perpetrating a type of lie often referred 
to as the “fixed-pie lie”. By misleading the human player into 
believing they were seeking the same items, it was able to con-
cede items that seemed valuable, but were actually nearly worth-
less to it. This, plus its generally friendly demeanor, allowed it to 
appear fair while claiming more value than its opponent.  
3.1.7  Overview 
As with human-human negotiation, there are many effective tac-
tics that can lead to success in agent negotiation. Among the 
agents that were submitted to this competition, for example, 
there are several that use emotion in an attempt to influence 
their opponent. This strategy (particularly the use of negative 
emotions to gain concession) has been well-documented both in 
human-human and human-agent contexts [16]. Agent Cena, the 
runner-up agent in terms of points scored, applied this tactic. 
Conversely, some agents in the competition attempted to build 
rapport with the human-participant through positive emotion, 
with the hope that it would lead to greater value. The top-rated 
agent for likeability, Agent Wotan, used this strategy.  
Another major tactic used in the competition was deception. 
The aptly-named LyingAgent was able to employ this strategy to 
“grow the pie” of the negotiation and claim more than its fair 
share of the result. Lying in negotiation is a well-established tac-
tic, and indeed the LyingAgent has been subsequently described 
in detail in publications both before and after the competition 
[2,13,14]. The ethics of these tactics have also been explored [15]. 
All the agents also model their opponent to an extent, alt-
hough Agent Murphy and Elphaba take the greatest steps in do-
ing so, both incorporating a reliability metric for how certain 
they are of opponent preferences. Agent Murphy, additionally, 
takes a pessimistic view of the potential outcomes.  
4 RESULTS & ANALYSES 
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4 
4.1 Method 
For the purposes of the competition, all agents’ score and likea-
bility rating (see below) averages were compared one-to-one. 
Dunnett’s 2-sided test confirmed any significant differences for 
one-way contrasts against the baseline agent, Pinocchio. Signifi-
cant differences between submitted agents were determined with 
post-hoc analysis, using Bonferroni correction. For winners, se-
lection of first-place vs. runner up was broken in the direction of 
the trend for prize-awarding purposes, if no significant differ-
ence was observed. Likeability was determined by a series of 
self-reported 7-point Likert questions that were answered by the 
participants after negotiation: 
• How satisfied were you with the final agreement? 
• How much do you like your opponent? 
• Would you negotiate with this opponent again? 
Cronbach’s α for these was 0.880, indicating high reliability.  
4.2 Likeability 
All agents were less likeable than the baseline agent, although 
the difference between Agent Wotan and the baseline was only 
marginally significant (p = .068). Specifically, the baseline had a 
mean likeability rating that was 1.18 points higher than Wotan. 
Agent Wotan and Elphaba were the two most likeable, after the 
baseline (Figure 2). Wotan and Elphaba were also not significant-
ly different from each other, with a mean likeability difference of 
only .287 (p = 1.00). However, Elphaba was significantly worse 
than the baseline (differing by 1.47, p = .010). 
4.3 Agent Score 
Agent score took into account the total agent points earned only. 
Here, the top performing agent was the LyingAgent. Agent Cena 
was the runner-up in terms of agent point score, and both it and 
the LyingAgent scored significantly more than the baseline per 
ANOVAs with post-hoc Bonferroni corrections. Agent Cena fea-
tured a mean difference of 6.86 points over baseline (p < .01). 
Similarly, the LyingAgent beat the baseline with a mean differ-
ence of 9.64 points (p < .001). The difference between Agent 
Cena and the LyingAgent was not significant (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 2: Agent Likeability (7-Point Likert) 
 
Figure 3: Agent Points (Averages) 
4.4 Agent Behaviors’ Effects on Score 
One goal of competitions such as ANAC is to try to determine 
the specific antecedents to good outcomes when possible—can 
we determine what sort of behaviors from the agents do lead to 
increased points, for example? Post-hoc regression analysis of 
some of the more salient factors leads to takeaways for agent 
design. 
The number of offers that the agents make varies largely be-
tween agents. And while more offers mean more information 
exchanged, such a torrent of offers may reveal more about how 
disagreeable the human partner was, especially if the agents of-
ten counter-offer. And indeed, this is the case, although the ef-
fects differed even when within the same category of agents (i.e., 
the “Likeability winners” vs. the “Point winners”). Specifically, 
the LyingAgent tended to receive more points when it made 
fewer offers (t = -3.378, N = 21, p=.003). Elphaba also received 
more points when it made fewer offers (t = -2.143, N = 25, p = 
.043). Conversely, Agent Cena received more points as it made 
more offers (t = 2.354, N=25, p = .027). The other agents did not 
present significant relationships. 
These results can be further examined by combining them 
with the amount of information the agent had available to it. All 
the agents attempted to model user preferences—indeed Agent 
Murphy and Elphaba had explicit measures of reliability. Human 
participants, however, tend to make few offers themselves, so 
agents often must rely on explicit statements of preferences by 
the human users themselves. We can find a simulacrum of user 
model accuracy from the data by examining the number of 
(truthful) statements that users made about their own prefer-
ences. Sadly, the majority of the submitted agents did not ade-
quately utilize this information. No significant correlations were 
found between the number of user preference statements made 
and the agent’s point outcome, except for Elphaba’s case, where 
the result was distinctly negative (t = -2.222, N = 25, p = .036). 
Nevertheless, information is only as good as it is used. If an 
agent has a good user model (due to having preference infor-
mation), then it might only be useful if the agent actually uses 
this information to make strategically informed decisions. Specif-
ically, the LyingAgent required a very accurate user model in 
able to successfully perpetrate its lie and claim value. When ex-
amining the relationship between the number of offers made by 
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the agent and the amount of user information is gathered, the 
LyingAgent shows a significant gain. Explicitly, there exists a 
two-way interaction between the number of offers made by the 
agent and the number of preference statements received from 
the user for the LyingAgent.1 Specifically, when the LyingAgent 
makes many offers, it performs better if it also has access to the 
user’s preferences, while it performs much worse if it does not. 
This interaction is detailed in Figure 4. There was a main, nega-
tive effect of the number of offers made by the agent, controlling 
for the number of preferences expressed by the human (t = -
3.792, N = 21, p = .001). There was a main, positive effect of the 
number of preferences, controlling for the number of offers (t = 
2.424, N = 21, p = .027). Finally, there was an interaction between 
offers and preferences (t = 2.172, N = 21, p = .044). 
4.5 Agent Behaviors’ Effects on Likeability 
While the point value of a single negotiation represents a good 
metric for an agent’s success, over time, this may be eclipsed by 
how much the agent is liked by its opponent. Given the choice, 
people do not often return to negotiations with people (or 
agents) that they dislike. Therefore, likeability provides another 
valid metric for measuring success. For the top-scoring agent in 
likeability (Agent Wotan), the number of messages sent by the 
agent was correlated to its likeability (t = 2.564, N=23, p = .018). 
However, for one of the top-scoring agents in points (Agent 
Cena), the correlation was significant, and negative (t = -2.125, 
N=25, p = .045). In short, when Agent Cena sent messages, it re-
duced the likeability rating, while when Agent Wotan sent mes-
sages, the likeability rating increased (Figure 5). These results are 
perhaps not surprising, since in negotiation, the content of the 
message is important. Agent Cena, whose dialogue consisted of 
aggressive remarks, had a markedly different effect on players 
than did its more conciliatory cousin, Wotan.
 
Figure 4: Winning Agent (LyingAgent) – Score by User 
Preference Statements and Offers Made by Agent 
1 Note that while the users CAN lie about their preferences, this behavior is tracked 
in IAGO’s data, and is uncommon. 
 
Figure 5: Significant Likeability & Agent Messages  
Interaction 
Because human negotiators are often concerned with ideas of 
fairness, agents that can successfully seem “fair” most likely 
have a good user model (and good strategic use of it). The final 
distribution of the points in the negotiation can be examined to 
determine the actual fairness of a deal (although this does NOT 
correlate exactly to the perceived fairness of a deal, a fact ex-
ploited by the LyingAgent). By examining the percentage of the 
total points that went to the agent, the relationship between this 
outcome and likeability can be analyzed. For two of the top-
scoring agents (Cena and Wotan), this relationship was signifi-
cant: (t = -3.37, N = 25, p = .003) for Cena and (t = -4.34, N = 24, p 
< .001) for Wotan. When either agent took more than its fair 
share of the points in a negotiation, its likeability suffered. Inter-
estingly, this negative trend existed for all agents, except the Ly-
ingAgent, where the trend was slightly positive (but not signifi-
cant). See Figure 6. 
5 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS 
The agents submitted to this competition attempted to solve the 
problems required of intelligent negotiators: they modeled their 
opponents, determined their own strategies, and adapted to hu-
man behavior. In doing this, they followed a number of varied 
strategies which utilized all the channels supported within 
IAGO: messaging, offer exchange, and emoting. The two top-
performing agents relied on using advanced tactics such as ex-
pression of anger (Agent Cena) or lying about the agent’s own 
preferences in order to claim value (LyingAgent). Furthermore, 
the two most likeable agents (beyond the baseline), also utilized 
emotion and dialogue to create rapport with the human partici-
pant (Agent Wotan & Elphaba). 
What is perhaps most striking about these results is how var-
ied the effective tactics seem to be. Agents that send a great deal 
of messages to the player can lead to increased likeability ratings 
(in the case of Agent Wotan), or reduced ratings (Cena) but this 
is not universal. And while the relationship between scoring well 
and liking one’s opponent is certainly predictable, these results 
illustrate a very important point about how humans perceive 
outcomes. The LyingAgent worked by convincing humans 
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Figure 6: Scatterplot of Likeability Rating vs. Percentage of Value Claimed by Agent (Trend-lines included) 
that they were getting a fair deal (when they were actually much 
closer to a 70/30 split). The LyingAgent had a great deal of vari-
ance in how it was perceived (see Figure 6), but when it was able 
to successfully sell its lie, it appeared to do wellIn the future, we 
hope to reduce the divide between the categories of agents into 
“likeability” agents and “point-scoring” ones. Future competi-
tions within ANAC in the Human-Agent League will involve 
repeated negotiations, in which reputational effects may cause 
the long-term benefits of likeable strategies to shine. Further-
more, short-sighted strategies such as those employed by Agent 
Cena and LyingAgent may backfire, with scores plummeting in 
later rounds. For these reasons and more, we look forward to the 
continued evolution of negotiating agents, and their perfor-
mance in future competitions. 
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